The war in Afghanistan is at a tipping point. For the past 8 years, the NATO-led forces have been fighting doggedly against a highly resilient and surprisingly adaptable Taleban insurgency. However, the inability of the Bush administration to articulate a clear strategy beyond “search and destroy” missions has seen the operation stuck in a tail chasing exercise that requires fresh thinking and innovative new approaches.

Currently, the US has about 38,000 troops in Afghanistan, with 32,000 more NATO troops as well as contributions from other countries. Australia is the largest non-NATO contributor with over 1,000 troops (including 300 SAS) largely situated in the south-central Oruzgan province. Recently, the President Obama announced plans for the deployment of 17,000 more US troops into the southern areas of Afghanistan along the porous border with Pakistan.

However, the question must be asked of this new approach as to whether it is simply a reproduction of the “surge” policy that has been lauded with increasing security in Iraq or is it part of a policy stemming from an understanding of the conditions unique to this most vital of conflicts?

The new policy is significant in two respects. First, it is packaged as a “counter-insurgency strategy”, one that recognises the need for a change in priorities or aims in US Afghanistan policy where priority is now placed on containing and countering Taleban and Al-Qaeda militancy rather than loftier goals of forging a peaceful and democratic Afghanistan, at least in the short to medium term.

Second, it signifies a long-term commitment on the part of the US, NATO members and others including Australia to a 10-15 year process that involves not only military activity but engagement with key antagonists (i.e. the Taleban) as well as costly and time consuming political reconstruction. This would also mean that the current and any future Australian troops would be carrying out higher risk operations.

Crucially, the new strategy is vague on how to deal with events in Pakistan that are central to the continuing conflict in Afghanistan. For instance, the Swat Valley region in the North-West Frontier Province is under effective Taleban rule. In order to pacify this situation, the new Pakistani government has signed an agreement whereby the Taleban leadership are free to implement shari`ah law in the province. The Taleban have also grown in strength in areas such as the poorer suburbs in Karachi and Islamabad.

The growing instability in Pakistan raises the danger that Obama’s aggressive rhetoric vis-à-vis Pakistan and Afghanistan (talk of unilateral strikes inside Pakistan) combined with an increased troop presence may alienate the very insurgents he needs to bring in under this new counter-insurgency strategy.

Therefore, unless this policy is managed with the utmost care, an increase in troop numbers may aggravate the situation and put off-side the co-operation of the local population needed to successfully carry out a counter-insurgency operation. The Rudd government must be mindful of this in their response to calls from Washington for an increase in Australian troop commitments. They need to carefully consider whether they will add or detract from the factors that have intensified the seemingly uncontrollable instability in this most vital of regions.